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INSIDER TRADING PRIOR TO HOSPITALITY 
ACQUISITION PAYMENT TYPE ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
Seonghee Oak  
and  
William Andrew 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines evidence of whether hospitality insiders use personal private 
information to maximize their private benefits prior to hospitality acquisition payment 
type announcements.  The findings of this study, with few exceptions, do not support the 
hypothesis that hospitality insiders undertake abnormal insider trading using inside 
information about the true value of the acquiring firm when an acquisition payment type 
is announced.  For hospitality acquiring firms using stock or cash financing to pay for the 
acquisition, the level of abnormal insider transactions in the four quarters prior to an 
acquisition payment announcement was not significant.  However, for hospitality 
acquirers using mixed financing (cash and stock), abnormal insider sales were positive 
and significant in the four quarters prior to the announcement.  The lack of significant 
results for the all cash or stock payment announcements may reflect legal constraint on 
insider trading, managerial control or compensation issues.  
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Introduction 
 
This study examines the effect of information asymmetry on insider trading 
activities in hospitality firms when the firms announce a particular type of payment for 
acquisition.  In modern hospitality corporations, managers and shareholders may have 
different information about the true value of their firm (Brealy & Myers, 2000).  This 
results in information asymmetry between the hospitality firm’s managers and the firm’s 
investors that may allow the managers to obtain abnormal trading profits (at the expense 
of investors) through purchases or sales of their firm’s stock based on the manager’s 
private information (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Yook, Gangopadhyay & McCabe, 1999; 
Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005). 
 
In the case of a hospitality acquisition, the decision of how to finance the 
acquisition may reveal the manager’s true perception of the value of their firm’s shares 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 2005).  In addition, rational behavior would be expected to 
encourage a hospitality manager to exploit such information asymmetry (especially 
where there are no other constraints, such as insider trading laws).  In this situation, when 
managers of an acquiring hospitality firm perceive the shares of their firm to be 
overvalued, they may use those shares to pay for the acquisition and also sell their own 
(overvalued) personal shares before the acquisition payment announcement is made 
(Seyhun, 1990).  When the managers of acquiring hospitality firms perceive their shares 
to be undervalued, they may avoid using the firm’s shares to finance the acquisition and 
instead finance the acquisition with cash (Seyhun, 1990).  In this situation, to take 
advantage of their prior knowledge of the firm’s true value, they would buy shares of 
their firm before the acquisition payment announcement.  When managers of acquiring 
hospitality firms perceive their shares to be fairly valued (all other factors being equal), 
they may be indifferent to using stock or cash to finance an acquisition and thus may be 
more inclined to use a mix of stock and cash as payment.  In this situation, there should 
be no abnormal buying or selling on the manager’s personal account before the 
acquisition payment announcement is made.     
 
These various theoretical transactions by insiders in response to private 
information about the true valuation of their hospitality firm presuppose that hospitality 
managers are subject to no other influences on their behavior.  However, securities law 
requires managers to report their transactions to the SEC in a timely fashion in order to 
prevent illegal insider trading around acquisitions (Meulbroek 1992; Ke, Huddart & 
Petroni 2003).  Hence, the results of this study may be influenced by how well the 
regulation of insider trading deters the acquiring firm’s informed managerial trading prior 
to the hospitality acquisition payment announcement.      
 
This study empirically examines insider trading prior to acquisition payment type 
announcements and represents the first formal examination of this subject in the 
hospitality literature.  Despite persistent debate over the level of market efficiency in the 
financial markets and the importance of information asymmetry, none of the research in 
hospitality has so far addressed the process of insider trading around hospitality corporate 
events.  In addition, previous hospitality research related to hospitality acquisitions has 
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utilized an event study methodology where share price abnormal returns are calculated 
for the acquiring firms and targets (Kwansa, F., 1994; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Canina, 
2001).  Since insider trading prior to acquisition payment type announcements has not 
been examined in the hospitality literature, this study should help to define its importance 
in a hospitality framework and may also offer insight as to the effects of such 
announcement and related insider trading on hospitality firm shareholder value.  Finally, 
since hospitality firms tend to need to raise significant amounts of capital to finance their 
operations, it is important that investors in hospitality firms have confidence that the 
managers of these firms do not exploit their inside knowledge of the firm’s prospects at 
the expense of the firm’s investors.  This study should help to clarify this issue.   
Literature Review 
 
Several authors in the hospitality literature (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000; Canina, 2001) have 
examined consolidation and acquisition activity by hospitality firms.  Explanations such 
as valuation, expense reduction, increased market power, increased economies of scale 
and scope, reduced earnings volatility, reducing agency problems, and tax savings have 
been suggested as reasons for such activity.   Empirically, these studies have measured 
market gains/losses around the acquisition announcement to test the effect of the 
acquisition and consolidation activity on firm value.  Using an event study methodology, 
the studies  showed positive short-term abnormal returns for both acquiring firms and the 
target (Kwansa, 1994; Canina, 2001) but negative long-term cumulative abnormal returns 
for the acquiring firms (Sheel & Nagpal, 2000).  In contrast, this study examines the 
behavior, prior to the date of the actual acquisition (payment type) announcement, of 
hospitality managers with potential inside information.  The methodology includes 
comparing managerial buying/selling of their personal shares in the period prior to the 
announcement with a three year base period established for control purposes four years 
before the announcement.  This different approach should help to supplement the existing 
hospitality literature and offer another perspective on the hospitality acquisition process 
(for comparison purposes, a long term event study analysis of the acquiring firm’s 
performance by acquisition payment type has been included in Appendix A).  
 
All of the studies have potential implications for the existence of efficient 
markets. Fama (1970) first defined the efficient market hypothesis, which is a framework 
for examining how information influences stock prices.  If a financial market is efficient, 
stock prices will fully reflect all available information and investors cannot consistently 
beat the market.  However, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) developed the 
impossibility of efficient market such that some investors remain uninformed.  One can 
attribute information asymmetry in hospitality acquisitions to a manager’s private 
information about an acquiring firm’s economic value (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 
1992; Loughran & Vijh, 1997).  Although managers in acquiring hospitality firms may 
have information about the future prospects of the combined firms, outside investors do 
not have access to that information.  Thus it is possible that managers of hospitality 
acquiring firms can use their private information to trade their firms’ shares on their 
personal accounts and that this insider trading can lessen the market value of their firms 
(Seyhun, 1990; Madison, Roth & Soporoschenko, 2004).  In this case, the insider trading 
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of the acquiring hospitality firm’s managers will be gains for the managers and losses for 
the outside investors.    
 
One can reduce this adverse selection problem with what is known as a “signal,” 
which Spence (1974) defined as a manipulatable attribute or activity that conveys 
information.  Several signals appear prior to acquisitions, and they include insider trading 
and the type of payment offered to the target.  The type of payment—cash, stock or 
mixed—constitute a signal in an acquisition announcement, reflecting the manager’s 
perception of the overvaluation or undervalution of a firm (Seyhun, 1990).  For example, 
if managers of acquiring firms perceive an overvaluation of their firm’s shares, they 
would be motivated to use stock to pay to the target.  When the managers pay with 
overvalued stock, the cost of acquisition will be reduced by the amount that the shares are 
overvalued.  Thus if a hospitality acquiring firm undertakes an acquisition paying with its 
own stock,  this suggests that its managers perceive the economic value of that stock to 
be lower than its market value (Brealey & Myers, 2000).  The reverse is likely to be true 
for a cash financed acquisition i.e., if managers perceive an undervaluation of their firm’s 
shares, they would be motivated to pay in cash.  Previous (non-hospitality) research does 
offer indirect support for this idea by showing that the subsequent performance of an 
acquiring firm is related to the type of payment offered in an acquisition.  For example, 
several studies have shown that a cash offer from an acquiring firm produces a more 
favorable long-run announcement effect than does a stock-financed offer (Agrawal, Jaffe 
& Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). 
 
Private information presents hospitality insiders with opportunities for personal 
trading (Rozeff & Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Jenter, 2005).  If hospitality 
insiders have private information, they can use it for their private benefit–namely, to 
make positive abnormal returns on their investment portfolio.  Insider trading by an 
acquiring hospitality firm’s managers can also signal a manager’s perception of her 
firm’s performance after the acquisition.  In the case of a hospitality acquisition payment 
type announcement, knowledge of the difference between the market and the economic 
value of the acquiring hospitality firm prior to the announcement can give insiders an 
opportunity to trade their own shares advantageously (Seyhun, 1990).  
 
Empirical tests suggest that managers often know their firm’s stock price 
movement in advance and behave proactively.  Finnerty (1976) found that during an 
eleven-month holding period,  insider purchases of their firm’s shares produced positive 
excess returns for the insiders while  insider sales of their firm’s shares  enabled them to 
avoid negative excess returns.  Seyhun (1986, 1990) demonstrated that insiders tend to 
rely on private information to govern their transaction timing.  While insiders purchase 
their firm’s stock prior to an abnormal rise in stock prices, they tend to sell it prior to an 
abnormal decline in stock prices.  Seyhun showed that during the 100 days subsequent to 
the insider trading day, abnormal returns on insider selling portfolios were negative, and 
abnormal returns on insider buying portfolios were positive. Seyhun also showed that in a 
takeover, bidder managers make more prior insider purchases when the stock price 
reaction to the takeover announcement is large and positive than when it is large and 
negative.  Seyhun, therefore, concluded that managers in acquiring firms generally time 
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their transactions to sell before stock-financed acquisitions and to purchase before cash-
financed acquisitions.  Likewise, Yook, Gangopadhyay and McCabe (1999) showed that 
insiders of acquiring firms tend to sell before stock offers relative to before cash offers.  
In addition, their study reported that cash offers have higher abnormal returns on the 
acquisition announcement date than stock offers. 
 
More recent insider trading studies support the fact that insiders undertake trading 
based on their private information of firm’s fundamental value and in a manner to avoid 
legal constraints on their trading. Insider sales increased three to nine quarters prior to 
announcements that earnings in the current quarter were less that earnings for the same 
quarter of the previous year (Ke, Huddart, Petroni, 2003).  Ke’s study also showed that 
insiders have timely trading strategies for avoiding civil and criminal liability.  For 
example, in bank mergers, the targeted bank insiders significantly decreased both insider 
sales and insider purchases one year prior to the merger announcement (Madison, Roth & 
Saporoschenko, 2004).  Insiders may also, in general, time their purchases and sales to 
their perception of the value of the company even in the absence of significant corporate 
events.  Insiders in low valuation firms (value firms) may buy their shares and insiders in 
high valuation firms (growth firms) may see advantages in selling their shares (Rozeff & 
Zaman, 1998; Lakonishok & Lee, 2001; Piotroski & Roulston, 2003; Jenter 2005).  This 
general insider trading has been shown to be consistent with the subsequent market 
movement of the firm’s share price (Lakonishok & Lee, 2001).   
 
All of these studies imply that there may be a tendency for hospitality managers 
who have knowledge about the true valuation of their firm’s shares to trade the shares for 
their own personal benefit prior to acquisition payment type announcements.  This study 
will offer evidence as to whether this may be the case and under what circumstances such 
trading occurs.   
Insider Trading Regulation 
 
Although the government regulates insider trading to keep private information 
from penalizing the uninformed investor, insider trading can still adversely influence 
stock prices in the financial market.  While economists Calton and Fischel (1983) long 
ago defined insider trading as “a transaction by those better informed than their trading 
partners,” insider trading in a legal sense is “a transaction within a six-month period prior 
to corporate events based on material information held by insiders or their tippers (Calton 
& Fischel, 1983)”.  Material information means that “reasonable investors would 
consider the information important to their investment decisions (Meulbroek, 1992).”  
Until 1980, neither the corporation nor an investor trading on the opposite side of an 
insider transaction had any legal remedies against the insider.  Only common law rules 
allowed suits against insiders for trading, and “the strictures of contract law applied only 
if the plaintiff could prove such special facts as misrepresentation of the security value 
(Calton & Fischel, 1983).”   
 
Insider trading regulation became much stricter by statute after 1980, and anyone 
with material and confidential information about a firm could no longer trade its 
securities prior to corporate informational events.  The Insider Trading and Securities 
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Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) 
created a reward program to insider 
trading informants, made top managers bear responsible for employee’s illegal trading, 
and raised criminal penalties (Ke, Huddart & Petroni, 2003).  But despite the strict 
regulation of insider trading since 1980, there is little evidence that the increased 
enforcement of insider trading sanctions has actually deterred insider trading (Seyhun, 
1992).  This failure in the statutes appears to reflect a lack of congressional oversight, 
high insider trading frequency, diverse insider trading schemes that escape legal 
definition, and the high legal costs of proving insider trading.  In addition, “safe harbor” 
rules that enable insiders to avoid any risk of insider trading liability, allows employees 
to file selling plans with the SEC and to sell their stocks regularly on a set date.  This 
arrangement enables insiders to sell their stock legally prior to corporate informational 
events (Shell, 2001).  The study presented here does not distinguish illegal trading from 
legal trading prior to acquisition payment announcements in the hospitality industry.  
Rather, it analyzes all insider trading at least one year before the public acquisition 
payment announcement.   
Data 
 
 
This study examines payment type announcements by acquiring hospitality firms 
which bought either public or private hospitality firms.   To identify those acquiring firms 
with a public hospitality target, the authors first identified   target hospitality firms 
delisted from a stock exchange and then searched to find the matching acquiring firms.  
The authors used the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes for all NYSE, 
AMEX, and Nasdaq hospitality firms (SIC industry codes: hotel 7011, restaurant 5812, 
casino 7999, and cruise 4481) delisted during the 1983-1999 period.  The CRSP tapes 
assign firms that are delisted because of being acquired a delisting code between 200 and 
203.  After identifying the delisted firms (targets), the authors consulted the Wall Street 
Journal Index to determine the acquiring firms.   
To collect acquiring firm data where the target was a private hospitality firm, trade 
magazines like Hotel & Motel Management and National Restaurant News were used.  In 
addition to these sources, the Mergerstat Review and the Merger Yearbook was used to 
identify additional acquisitions in the hospitality industry not found in the other sources.  
The search for acquiring hospitality firms buying either private or public hospitality 
target firms produced a total of 111 observations between 1983 and 1999.  The authors 
divided this sample of acquiring firms into three subsets based on the acquisition 
payment type (cash, stock and mixed) as reported in the Dow Jones News Service 
(DJNS).  If the payment type for the observation was unknown, the acquisition was 
excluded from this study.  This reduced the sample size from 111 announcements to 80 
(the time period of acquisition announcements in the reduced sample ranged from 1988 
to 1999).  The first sample subset consisted of the stock-payment group (where only the 
acquirer’s common stock was used to pay for the acquisition) and contained 35 of the 80 
observations.  The second sample subset consisted of the cash-payment group (where 
only cash was used to pay for the acquisition) and included 20 of the 80 observations.  
The last sample subset consisted of the mixed-payment group (where both cash and stock 
were used to pay for the acquisition) and contained 25 of the 80 observations (see 
The Sample of Acquiring Hospitality Firms 
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Appendix B). The event date for the acquisition payment type announcement was taken 
as the first date of the acquisition payment announcement on the DJNS (Ahn, Cao & 
Choe 2001).  The event date for majority of sample (75 of the 80 observations) was the 
same day as that of the first public announcement of the acquisition.  
 
The authors obtained insider trading data on the 80 observations in the sample from 
First Call Insider Research for the period 1984 to 1999 (although the empirical sample 
period starts in 1988, it is necessary to have the data four years prior to establish an initial 
control period.  See page 13 for specific details).  First Call Insider Research compiled 
the information from the original SEC filings.   The SEC defines an insider as an 
executive, officer, director, or any individual in a policy-making position or a beneficial 
owner (holder of 10 percent or more of the stock).  This study excluded beneficial owners, 
a measure consistent with previous insider trading studies (Kahle, 2000; Clarke, Dunbar 
& Kahle, 2001).  This is also supported by Seyhun (1986) who suggested that trades by 
principal shareholders who are neither officers nor directors convey comparatively little 
information.   
A time lag occurs between insider transactions and when insiders report their 
transactions to the SEC.  Several previous studies used the day of filing insider 
transactions to the SEC as the insider trading day (see, for example, Clarke, Dunbar & 
Kahle, 2001).  In this study, however, we use the actual trading date of the insider 
transaction, consistent with Seyhun (1990).  Using the actual trading date may reduce 
errors attributable to delayed reporting since managers may use the delayed disclosure 
provision to unload shares when they foresee bad news (Cheng, Nagar & Rajan, 2003).  
Under Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insiders are required to 
report any transaction to the SEC on Form 4 by the tenth of the month following the trade 
(Cheng, Nagar & Rajan, 2003).  Those insiders who have had exempt transactions and 
have not reported on Form 4 are required to file annually through Form 5 (Cheng, Nagar 
& Rajan, 2003).    
This study used data on hospitality officers’ and directors’ trading during the period 
prior to an acquisition payment announcement.  Abnormal insider trading was calculated 
by comparing insider trades in the study period (four quarters prior to the announcement) 
with insider trades in a control period of 36 months (beginning 48 months prior to the 
acquisition payment announcement and ending 12 months prior to the announcement).  In 
addition, this study used only open-market stock transactions to determine insider sales 
and insider purchases (Kahle, 2000; Clarke, Dunbar & Kahle, 2001).  The other types of 
transactions excluded from this study (such as exercising options and selling warrants) 
generally account for only 10 percent of total insider transactions (Meulbroek, 1992) and 
may also be influenced by the firm’s compensation policy (Madison, Roth & 
Saporoschenko, 2004).   
Finally, five observations from original twenty observations in the cash sample were 
excluded from the analysis because they produced no insider transactions in either the 
control period or the period one year prior to the acquisition announcement.  Thus the 
 
 
Insider Trading Data 
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Body Text First Indent
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Hidden
Deleted:  
 8
cash sample size was reduced to 15 observations and the overall sample to 75 
observations.   
The remaining sample of acquiring firms has the following industry distribution: hotels 
(20 observations), REITs (14 observations), restaurants (32 observations), casinos (7 
observations), cruise lines (1 observation) and country clubs (1 observation).   Although 
it would be interesting, an analysis by each industry segment was not possible due to the 
small sample sizes.   
Using the LexisNexis database, the authors checked whether any insider in the entire 
sample of acquiring firms has been charged with insider trading by the SEC in a civil or 
administrative case.  There was only one insider trading case among the acquiring firms 
in the sample.  In 1994, the secretary to a Hilton director provided inside information 
(Hilton’s plan of hiring an investment bank to facilitate its expansion plans) to a British 
man previously charged by the SEC.  The secretary paid $10,000 to settle the charges.  
The British man was charged with a fine of $458,458 (Wall Street Journal 1995).         
Methodology 
Kahle (2000) suggests that two valid measures of insider trading are the number of 
times insiders trade (a trade-based measure) and the number of shares traded (a volume-
based measure).  This study used the number of times hospitality insiders trade their 
firms’ shares, weighting what each insider buys or sells equally, regardless of the number 
of shares involved. Three reasons account for this choice.  First, Clarke, Dunbar and 
Kahle (2001) reported that the number of times insiders trade (trade-based measure) and 
the number of shares traded (volume-based measure) produce the same results with 
regard to insider trading.  Second, the optimal size of an information motivated trade may 
be medium to small if expected legal penalties increase with the size of the trade.  Third, 
share price changes should be related more to the number of insider purchases and sales 
than to changes in the proportion of the firm held by the managers (Bradford, 1987).   
This study used hospitality insider trading in the four quarters before an acquisition 
announcement to determine insider trading patterns (consistent with Clarke, Dunbar & 
Kahle (2001)).  Annual abnormal sales (purchases) were calculated.  They are defined as 
actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in the given year, where 
expected sales (purchases) are the mean annual sales (purchases) of that firm in the 36-
month period beginning 48 months prior to the acquisition payment announcement.  The 
authors used this procedure to calculate the abnormal number of sales and purchases per 
firm for the year prior to the acquisition payment announcement.   
Since insiders are under some legal constraints in regard to trading on their own 
account during the six month period prior to an acquisition, the abnormal number of sales 
and purchases per quarter during the 1 year period prior to the acquisition payment 
announcement were also calculated for each acquiring firm.  Quarterly abnormal sales 
(purchases) are defined as actual sales (purchases) minus expected sales (purchases) in 
the given quarter, where expected sales (purchases) are the mean quarterly sales 
(purchases) of that firm in the 36-month period beginning 48 months prior to the 
acquisition payment announcement.   
T-tests were used to measure the significance of abnormal insider sales and 
purchases.  The level of significance (that actual trading is different from expected 
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trading) is reported at the ten-, five-, and one-percent levels.  Since the authors intend to 
measure whether abnormal insider sales and purchases are greater than those in the 
control period, the p-values are calculated using a one tail test. 
 
Results 
 
 
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are undervalued, they 
have an incentive to use cash to pay for an acquisition and likewise to purchase their 
firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to a cash acquisition financing 
announcement.  This would suggest that positive abnormal insider purchases occur prior 
to cash-financed acquisitions.   Our results do not support this.  Table 1  shows insider 
trading results for the period one year prior to the acquisition  (quarters -1 to -4) and also 
for each of the individual four quarters within that year (quarters -1, -2, -3 and -4).  
During the one year prior to the cash financed acquisition announcement, the t-statistic of 
abnormal insider purchases is insignificant.  This implies that insiders in acquiring firms 
did not, on average, make an unusual number of purchases in the one year prior to the 
announcement.   
Table 1 also presents the quarterly abnormal insider purchases for the one year prior to 
the acquisition payment type announcement.  This is important because insider trading 
may be concentrated from 6 to 12 months prior to the announcement to avoid insider 
trading legalities.   However, the quarterly abnormal insider purchases are negatively 
significant in the fourth (t-statistics = -1.580, p-value = 0.075) and second quarters (t-
statistics = -1.450, p-value = 0.08) prior to the announcement (the other quarters do not 
show statistically significant differences).  The results imply that insider purchases during 
the pre-acquisition period were less than during the control period which is the opposite 
implied by the hypothesis that a cash payment offer should be associated with prior 
increased insider purchases. 
 
The results for cash-financed acquisitions may be interpreted in several ways.   First, 
the managers of acquiring firms are aware of and adhere to the legal constraints on their 
trading.  Second, it is also possible that cash-financed acquisitions are made for reasons 
other than a perceived undervaluation of the acquiring firm.  If acquiring hospitality firms 
have cash available after all wealth-enhancing investments have been made, managers 
may use that cash to undertake transactions to increase their own utility rather than to 
maximize shareholder wealth.  For example, managers may choose to grow their firms 
through (non-value optimizing) mergers since executive compensation tends to relate 
positively to firm size (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999).  In fact, Qiu (2004) reported that 
even the presence of institutional investors (insurance companies, mutual funds and 
banks) and managerial ownership did not prevent value-reducing acquisition.  A third 
possibility  that might explain our results is that hospitality managers may decide to use 
cash-financed acquisitions even when the managers consider their stock overvalued 
because stock-financed acquisitions would dilute their managerial control and power in 
the newly combined firms (Martin, 1996).        
Insider Trading Prior to Cash-Financed Acquisition Payment Announcements 
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Body Text First Indent
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Body Text
Formatted: Hidden
Formatted: Body Text First Indent
Deleted: ¶
Deleted: 
Deleted:  
 10
 
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are overvalued, they 
have an incentive to use company stock to pay for an acquisition and likewise to sell their 
firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to a stock financed acquisition payment 
announcement.  This would suggest that positive abnormal insider sales occur prior to 
stock-financed acquisitions.  Our results do not support this.  Table 2 presents abnormal 
insider sales in for one year and on a quarterly basis prior to the stock acquisition 
payment type announcement.  During the one year prior to the acquisition payment 
announcement, the t-statistic of abnormal insider sales is insignificant (p-value= 0.28). 
This implies that insiders in hospitality acquiring firms do not, on average, make an 
unusual number of sales in the one year prior to the announcement of a stock financed 
acquisition.   
In addition, Table 2 shows that quarterly abnormal insider sales are negatively significant 
(at the 1 percent level) in the three of the four quarters prior to the announcement.  This 
implies that the pre-acquisition period insider sales in the three quarters were less than 
those during the control period.   Again, this is in direct opposition to the hypothesis that 
abnormal insider sales should increase prior to a stock financed acquisition payment 
announcement. 
 
These results may have several possible explanations. First, instead of open 
market sales, hospitality insiders with private information may pursue short-sales 
transactions to maximize their private benefits.  Insiders could try to sell short prior to the 
acquisition announcement believing that the stock’s price will fall and they can then buy 
the stock back at a lower price after the acquisition payment announcement. These 
transactions would not show up in the abnormal insider sales transactions.  Christophe, 
Ferri and Angel (2004) provide evidence that abnormal short-sales are significantly 
related to post-announcement stock returns.  Second, a recent study on executive option 
exercising has shown that insiders sell option acquired shares immediately to reduce their 
exposure to their firm’s stock (Carpenter & Remmers, 2001).  This may limit the number 
of shares that insiders have available to sell when they feel that the firm’s shares are over 
valued. Insider Trading Prior to Mixed-Financed Hospitality Acquisition Payment 
Announcements 
 
If managers of acquiring hospitality firms feel that their shares are fairly valued, they 
should be indifferent, ceterus paribus, to using cash or company stock to pay for an 
acquisition (and hence may use both) and likewise  should lack an incentive to either buy 
or sell their firms’ shares on their personal accounts prior to an acquisition payment 
announcement.  This would suggest that no positive abnormal insider sales or purchases 
occur prior to mixed financing (cash plus stock) hospitality acquisition announcements.   
Our results support this for insider purchases.  Table 3 presents abnormal insider 
purchases one year and on a quarterly basis prior to the acquisition payment type 
announcement.  During the entire one year period prior to the announcement, abnormal 
insider purchases are insignificant (p-value = 0.165).  This implies that insiders in 
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acquiring hospitality firms did not, on average, make an unusual number of purchases in 
the one year prior to the announcement.  However, it should be noted that for the one 
quarter period prior to the announcement, abnormal insider purchases are negatively 
significant (at the 10 percent level), implying that there are fewer insider purchases than 
during the control period.   However, this may simply be due to hospitality insiders 
avoiding the legal constraints against insider trading during this period. 
For insider sales prior to a mixed financing acquisition announcement, we do find 
significant abnormal insider sales of stock in the one year prior to the payment 
announcement. In table 4, the p-value for abnormal insider sales is significant (at the 5 
percent level) during the one year prior to a mixed acquisition financing announcement.  
This implies that insiders in acquiring firms did, on average, make an unusual number of 
sales in the one year prior to the announcement.  Examining the quarterly data for that 
one year period, all quarters except the one quarter prior to the announcement showed a 
statistically insignificant level of insider abnormal sales.  The first quarter prior to the 
announcement did show a significant level of abnormal sales (at 5 percent level).  These 
may have been planned sales so as not to violate insider sales legal constraints. 
A possible explanation for the statistically significant abnormal insider sales over the 
one year period prior to the payment type announcement in the mixed purchase sample is 
that even though the acquiring firm’s managers perceive their shares as overvalued, they 
may still use cash as part of the financing of the acquisition if their firm is particularly 
cash-rich (Harford, 1999).  Martin (1996) also suggests that managers may use some 
degree of cash financing when their managerial ownership in the acquiring firm is in a 
range from five to twenty-five percent in order to retain and maximize their managerial 
control and compensation (Martin, 1996).   
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
The findings of this research on insider trading do not consistently support the 
supposition that insiders in hospitality firms invariably use their private information to 
maximize their private benefits prior to public acquisition payment type announcements.  
These results may have several explanations, all of which present possible avenues for 
future research.  Securities laws may deter insiders of acquiring firms from exploiting 
illegal insider trading profits.  For example, in hospitality acquiring firms using only 
stock or cash financing, there were no significant abnormal transactions in the one year 
period prior to an acquisition payment type announcement.   These results suggest that 
the managers of acquiring firms do not trade on their own account to take advantage of 
privately held information about the true value of their firms in these circumstances and 
that one reason may be to avoid the legal constraints on insider trading prior to major 
information announcements.  For hospitality acquirers using mixed financing, abnormal 
insider sales are positive and significant (although purchases are not).  This result may, 
however, reflect attempts by managers to maximize their managerial control or 
compensation rather than taking advantage, through personal trading, of private 
information that they may have. In such a situation, some of these sales may have been 
planned sales thus avoiding the legal impediments to sales during this period.   
Even though the results of this study show a general lack of insider trading prior to an 
information event like the financing of an acquisition, the study does make an important 
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contribution to the hospitality literature related to insider trading.  No previous studies 
have focused on the area of insider trading in relation to hospitality firms. This study 
offers support for the view, at least in terms of acquisition payment type announcements, 
that hospitality managers do not use their private information to take unfair advantage of 
less informed investors in the financial market place.  Whether the manager’s motives are 
a result of enforcement of insider trading laws or affected by other considerations such as 
maintaining managerial ownership and control is a question for further study.  In any case, 
the results of this study should provide assurance to investors in hospitality firms that the 
managers of their firms do not take unfair advantage of them (at least in the case of 
acquisition payment type announcements) even when the managers may possess inside 
information not available to other investors about the true prospects of their firm. 
Additional research in this area might also look at the issue of free cash flow and 
managerial acquisition financing decisions.  If acquiring firms have significant amounts 
of free cash flow  they may have an incentive to use cash financing in an acquisition 
regardless of whether the managers perceive the firm’s shares to be fairly valued or not.  
Future studies into whether free cash flow is a significant variable in the acquisition 
payment choice decision would be helpful. 
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Table 1. Abnormal Insider Purchases Prior To Cash-Financed Hospitality 
Acquisition Payment Announcements 
Pre-acquisition period Sample size Mean 
standard 
deviation 
  
t-stat 
t-test      
 
p-value 
Quarters [-1 to -4] 15 -0.860 8.820 -0.360 0.375 
Quarter [-4] 15 -0.828 2.097 -1.580 0.075* 
Quarter [-3] 15 0.189 2.200 0.330 0.380 
Quarter [-2] 15 -0.678 1.807 -1.450 0.080* 
Quarter [-1] 15 0.528 3.182 0.640 0.280 
*:  significant at the 10% levels 
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Table 2. Abnormal Insider Sales Prior To Stock-Financed Hospitality 
Acquisition Payment Announcements 
Pre-acquisition 
period 
sample 
size Mean 
Standard 
deviation t-stat 
t-test       
 p-value 
Quarters [-1 to -4] 35 -1.620 15.940 -0.600 0.280 
Quarter [-4] 35 -0.200 6.200 -0.190 0.470 
Quarter [-3] 35 -1.610 3.648 -2.570 0.012*** 
Quarter [-2] 35 -0.190 5.597 -0.200 0.460 
Quarter [-1] 35 0.210 5.584 0.220 0.420 
***:  significant at the 1% levels 
 15
Table 3. Abnormal Insider Purchases Prior to Mixed-Financed Hospitality 
Acquisition Payment Announcements 
Pre-acquisition 
period 
Sample 
size Mean 
standard 
deviation t-stat 
t-test         
p-value 
Quarters [-1 to -4] 25 3.090 15.740 0.860 0.165 
Quarter [-4] 25 2.470 11.880 1.000 0.160 
Quarter [-3] 25 -0.250 2.982 -0.410 0.350 
Quarter [-2] 25 0.257 3.090 0.400 0.360 
Quarter [-1] 25 -0.438 1.518 -1.390 0.075* 
*:  significant at the 10% levels 
 
 16
 
Table 4. Abnormal Insider Sales Prior to Mixed Financed Hospitality Acquisition 
Payment Announcements  
 
**:  significant at the 5% levels 
 
Pre-acquisition 
period 
sample 
size Mean 
Standard 
deviation t-stat 
t-test         
p-value 
Quarters [-1 to -4] 25 2.860 7.900 1.770 0.045** 
Quarter [-4] 25 0.497 1.881 1.290 0.130 
Quarter [-3] 25 0.247 2.532 0.480 0.330 
Quarter [-2] 25 0.622 2.804 1.090 0.170 
Quarter [-1] 25 1.437 3.257 2.210 0.023** 
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Appendix A 
Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring firms 
If an acquiring firm’s managers use stock to pay for an acquisition, previous studies 
have shown that the acquiring firm has lower long-term abnormal returns than firms that 
use cash payments (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997).  The 
explanation that has been suggested is that in the long run post acquisition, the market 
value of overvalued stock converges to its economic value with the consequence that its 
abnormal returns are more negative than for cash payment offers (which assumes that the 
shares of acquiring firms making cash payment offers are less overvalued than stock offer 
firms). 
To measure the long-term post-acquisition performance of the acquiring firms, the 
monthly closing prices of the stock for each acquiring firms is obtained from the CRSP 
Monthly File.  Following Sheel and Nagpal (2000), the sample period is defined as a 36 
month period before and after the acquisition payment announcements (total of six years).  
The event period ranges from six months before to 36 months after the announcement 
date.  The estimation period for measuring the expected return in the market is defined as 
36 to seven months before the announcement date. 
To measure the long-term performance of acquiring firms, the market model was used 
(Brown & Warner, 1985; Sheel & Nagpal, 2000).    The market model specifies the linear 
relationship between security j returns and returns on a market portfolio as:  
jtR  = jα  + jβ  * mtR   + jtε  
where  jtR  = the monthly return on security j over month t 
jα  = expected value of ( jtR  - jβ * mR )   
jβ   = Cov ( jtR , mtR ) / Var ( mtR )  
mtR  = the market return on the CRSP equally-weighted market index over day t  
jtε  = random variable. 
An estimation period is from trading month t-36 through trading month t - 7, with respect 
to the acquisition announcement.  The abnormal return ( jtA ) for the security j on month t 
is defined as the difference between actual observations and estimated returns. 
jtA   = jtR   - [ jαˆ + jβˆ * mtR ],     t = -6, -5, …0, 1, …, 36, 
where jαˆ and jβˆ  are estimates of jα and jβ  by regressing jtR  on mtR  over the 
estimation period preceding the event window.  For the every month in the event period, 
the abnormal return ( jtA ) is averaged to make the sample mean   
jtAR  =  N
ANj jt∑ =1
, 
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where t is defined in trading month relative to the event day.  N is the number of 
securities in the sample.  Over the interval of beginning with six months prior to and 
ending with 36 months after the acquisition announcements, the cumulative abnormal 
return ( jtCAR ) is  
jtCAR  = ∑ −=
36
6t jtAR . 
A nonparametric rank test (Corrado, 1989; Nicolau, 2002) is used to test the significance 
of cumulative average abnormal returns within the event window.  The rank test is 
powerful even under highly nonnormal distributions and corrects the misspecification 
problem of other parametric tests due to the event-date excess return variance increases 
(Corrado, 1989).  The rank test (Nicolau, 2002) is calculated by:  
Z =  
∑ ∑
∑
= =
=






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where N = the number of securities, itK  = rank of the abnormal returns in the time series 
estimated for the security i, and T = the total number of months being observed. 
 
Table 5 shows that the cumulative abnormal returns of stock payment hospitality 
acquirers (-117.47 %) decline more steeply than those of cash payment hospitality 
acquirers (-80.11 %).  The returns for mixed payment acquirers (-105.28 %) are between 
those of the cash and stock payment acquirers. This is consistent with previous studies 
(Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992; Loghran & Vijh, 1997) and supports that the 
payment type offered in a hospitality acquisition is related to the valuation of acquiring 
firm.  It should also be noted that the event day (day 0) abnormal return sign is consistent 
with the hypothesis that cash payments indicate undervaluation of the firm’s shares and 
stock payments indicate potential overvaluation of the firm’s shares. 
Table 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for the event period 
Month Cash Mixed Stock 
  AR t 
Rank 
test Z CAR AR t 
Rank 
test Z CAR AR t 
Rank 
test Z CAR 
-6 -2.72% -0.58 -2.72% -0.59% 0.10 -0.59% 0.12% 0.24 0.12% 
-5 -2.45% -1.07 -5.17% -6.22% -0.71 -6.81% -7.91% -1.10 -7.79% 
-4 3.44% 2.110* -1.73% 6.96% 2.210* 0.15% 4.30% 1.800$ -3.49% 
-3 -2.59% -1.03 -4.32% -0.09% 0.31 0.06% 0.20% 0.58 -3.29% 
-2 1.14% 0.55 -3.18% -0.13% 0.50 -0.07% -0.05% 0.48 -3.34% 
-1 -3.95% -0.85 -7.13% 2.35% 0.97 2.28% 2.91% 1.02 -0.43% 
0 2.48% 0.70 -4.65% 1.69% 0.17 3.97% -1.33% 0.11 -1.76% 
1 -3.53% -0.76 -8.18% -2.77% -0.57 1.20% -1.77% -0.17 -3.53% 
2 -3.49% -0.92 -11.67% 2.42% 0.68 3.62% 3.42% 0.78 -0.11% 
3 1.00% 0.49 -10.67% -0.56% 0.16 3.06% -0.55% 0.23 -0.66% 
4 0.81% 0.52 -9.86% -3.78% -0.92 -0.72% -3.06% -0.60 -3.72% 
5 2.86% 1.11 -7.00% -1.23% -0.03 -1.95% -0.58% 0.22 -4.30% 
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6 -2.98% -0.62 -9.98% 0.17% 0.52 -1.78% 0.21% 0.59 -4.09% 
7 -1.70% -0.53 -11.68% -3.25% -1.03 -5.03% -5.71% -1.42 -9.80% 
8 0.79% 0.37 -10.89% 1.06% 0.33 -3.97% -1.09% -0.03 -10.89% 
9 -6.67% -1.30 -17.56% -4.54% -0.75 -8.51% -5.42% -0.84 -16.31% 
10 -2.63% -0.67 -20.19% -7.02% -2.04 -15.53% -9.33% -2.630* -25.64% 
11 -4.10% -2.01 -24.29% 0.63% -0.90 -14.90% 1.26% -0.55 -24.38% 
12 -3.83% -1.12 -28.12% -4.70% -1.17 -19.60% -4.51% -0.98 -28.89% 
13 0.08% 0.64 -28.04% -5.56% -1.02 -25.16% -6.61% -1.22 -35.50% 
14 -0.19% 0.42 -28.23% -4.51% -1.15 -29.67% -3.94% -1.10 -39.44% 
15 -4.31% -1.25 -32.54% -3.25% -0.19 -32.92% -4.38% -0.39 -43.82% 
16 1.34% 0.67 -31.20% -2.32% -0.65 -35.24% -1.86% -0.40 -45.68% 
17 -3.89% -0.92 -35.09% 2.55% 0.10 -32.69% -2.15% -0.17 -47.83% 
18 -7.05% -2.62 -42.14% -0.41% 0.27 -33.10% 0.65% 0.31 -47.18% 
19 -9.53% -2.80 -51.67% -5.05% -1.01 -38.15% -3.93% -0.50 -51.11% 
20 0.90% 1.03 -50.77% -7.27% -2.61 -45.42% -9.27% -2.750** -60.38% 
21 3.22% 1.08 -47.55% -0.69% -0.31 -46.11% -3.51% -1.04 -63.89% 
22 -5.53% -1.44 -53.08% 1.83% 0.82 -44.28% 2.31% 0.80 -61.58% 
23 -7.28% -1.76 -60.36% -7.15% -1.72 -51.43% -7.80% -1.990$ -69.38% 
24 -5.18% -1.13 -65.54% 0.46% -0.02 -50.97% 2.27% 0.44 -67.11% 
25 -4.39% -0.65 -69.93% -5.48% -0.98 -56.45% -7.33% -1.33 -74.44% 
26 -5.47% -1.42 -75.40% 0.19% -0.96 -56.26% 2.53% -0.48 -71.91% 
27 -0.58% 0.17 -75.98% -5.81% -1.52 -62.07% -6.53% -1.53 -78.44% 
28 2.10% -0.30 -73.88% -0.76% -0.21 -62.83% -0.86% -0.26 -79.30% 
29 -1.17% -0.71 -75.05% -9.04% -1.69 -71.87% -7.29% -1.10 -86.59% 
30 -3.15% -1.20 -78.20% -4.09% -1.34 -75.96% -0.71% -0.47 -87.30% 
31 0.83% 0.40 -77.37% -5.13% -1.07 -81.09% -3.94% -0.69 -91.24% 
32 -4.06% -1.15 -81.43% -6.98% -1.35 -88.07% -8.68% -1.54 -99.92% 
33 3.02% 0.38 -78.41% -7.13% -2.35 -95.20% -4.51% -1.58 -104.43% 
34 0.73% 0.46 -77.68% -9.59% -2.64 -104.79% -10.00% -2.810** -114.43% 
35 -1.03% -0.31 -78.71% -2.02% -0.25 -106.81% -2.27% -0.37 -116.70% 
36 -1.40% -0.70 -80.11% 1.53% 0.60 -105.28% -0.77% 0.02 -117.47% 
$,  *,  and  ** : significant at the 10%,  5%  and 1% levels, respectively at one tail test. 
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Appendix B.  
List of hospitality acquisition by payment types 
Cash Payment 
Acquirer Target 
Caesars World Inc Caesars New Jersey 
Harrah’s Entertainment Showboat Inc. 
Hollywood Park Casino Magic 
Mirage resorts Boardwalk Casino 
HFS Jackson Hewitt Inc. 
Marriott international Forum group Inc. 
Marriott  Renaissance 
Collins Foods Unit Del Taco 
CKE restaurant Advanced Unit 
Carrols Corp PolloTropical Inc 
Perkins Family restaurants Restaurant Co. 
Piccadilly Cafeterias Inc Morrison Restaurants Inc. 
Quality Dining Grady’s 
LaSalle Hotel Properties San Diego Princess Resort 
Patriot America hospitality Arcadian international Inc. 
 
 
Stock Payment 
Acquirer Target 
Harrah’s Entertainment Rio Hotel & Casino Inc. 
Hollywood Park Boomtown Inc 
MGM Grand Primadonna 
CapStar Hotel Co American General Hospitality Corp. 
HFS inc Casino & Credit Services Inc. 
HFS inc CUC International 
Hilton Bally’s Entertainment 
Hilton Grand Casinos Inc. 
Hudson hotels corps 6 limited partnership 
prime motor inn Cindy’a Inc 
Prime Hospitality Homegate Hospitality Inc. 
Promus Double Tree 
Doubletree RFS Inc. 
Microtel Franchise Hudson Hotels Corp. 
Apolena Capital Corp. Casino Creek Holdings 
Applebee’s international inc Pub Ventures 
Apple South Inc DF & R 
Manhattan Bagel I & J Bagel 
Daka International Champps Entertainment 
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Brinker International Border Café 
Brinker International Northwest Restaurant Inc. 
Brinker International Lettuce Entertain You Enterprise 
GB foods Timber Lodge 
Hometown buffet Buffets 
Longhorn Steaks Inc Bugaboo Creak Steak House 
Quality Dining Brugger’s 
Servico inc Impac Hotel Group 
Shoney’s TPI Enterprises Inc. 
Outback Steakhouse Lousiana Outback Steakhouse Inc. five Units 
Taco Cabana Inc. Two Pesos Inc. 
FelCor Lodging Trust Inc Bristol Hotel Co 
Hotel Investors Corp. Hotel Properties Inc. 
Humphrey hospitality trust Supertel Hospitality 
Patriot America hospitality Wyndham Hotel 
Extended Stay America  Studio Plus Hotels Inc. 
 
Mixed Payment 
Acquirer Target 
Nashville Country Club Avalon Entertainment 
Royal Caribbean International Celebrity Cruise Lines Inc. 
Marriott International Execustay Corp. 
Bristol Hotels 60 properties of Holiday Inn 
Doubletree Red Lion Inns 
Wyndham Clubhouse Hotels Inc. 
Apple South Inc Hops Grill & Bar Restaurants 
Boston Chicken Inc Mid-Atlantic Restaurant Systems LP 
Boston Chicken Inc Progressive Food Concepts Inc. 
CKE restaurant Summit Family Restaurants Inc. 
CKE restaurant Casa Bonita Inc. 
Koo Koo Roo Inc 14 properties of Hamlet Restaurant 
Laundry’s Seafood Bayport Restaurant 
New York Bagel Enterprises Lots A’ Bagels Inc. 
Bally Manufacturing Corp. Golden Nugget Inc. 
Chart House Enterprise Paradise Bakery Inc. 
Apple South Inc McCormick & Schmick’s Restaurant 
Starwood Lodging trust HEI 
Boykin lodging Red Lion Inns 
Starwood Lodging trust Westin Hotels & Resorts 
Starwood Lodging trust ITT Corp. 
Jameson Inns Signature Inns Inc. 
Meditrust La Quinta Inns Inc. 
Patriot America hospitality WHG resorts & casinos Inc. 
Patriot America hospitality Interstate Hotels 
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